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Executive Summary 
 
At the request of Congressman Stenholm, the Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute (FAPRI) has analyzed the reforms of the EU Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) that were approved in June 2003.   
 
The most important feature of the reform is the creation of a “single farm payment” that 
would eventually replace a variety of EU payment programs that benefit producers of 
grain, oilseeds, cattle, sheep, and milk.  The single farm payment would not be tied to 
current production of any commodity.  The reform also includes a number of adjustments 
to support prices and other CAP measures. 
 
One complicating feature of the reform is the flexibility it provides EU member states to 
maintain at least some proportion of current payment programs that are more directly tied 
to production.  Given uncertainty regarding how individual countries will use this 
flexibility, FAPRI examined two extreme scenarios: 
 
1) The MOST scenario assumes that all countries choose the maximum permissible 
level of decoupling by rolling all eligible payment programs into the single farm 
payment. 
2) The LEAST scenario assumes that all countries choose the minimum permissible 
level of decoupling by maintaining current coupled payment programs to the full 
extent allowed by the compromise agreement. 
 
Major results of the analysis include: 
 
• For many commodities, the reforms would have only modest impacts on supply, 
consumption, trade, and prices.  For example, EU net exports of wheat and coarse 
grains would fall by about 1 million metric tons, resulting in adjustments in both 
EU and world wheat and corn prices of less than 1 percent. 
 
• For the commodities where current payment programs are most closely tied to 
production, the reforms could have larger impacts.  In the MOST scenario, for 
example, EU cattle producers would reduce beef cow herds enough to reduce EU 
beef production by 4 percent in 2012 relative to maintaining current policies. 
 
• It appears that the reforms will allow the European Union to shift much of its 
internal support for producers from the WTO blue box to the green box.   
 
• Even in the LEAST scenario, it appears likely that remaining EU support in the 
blue box would be less than 5 percent of the value of production, consistent with 
the recent joint EU-U.S. negotiating framework proposal. 
 
• Projected EU amber box support is less than 50 percent of the negotiated Uruguay 
Round WTO ceiling. 
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Introduction
 
In June 2003 substantial reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were agreed 
to by the farm ministers of the European Union. In July, Congressman Stenholm asked 
FAPRI to review the reforms and report their likely impacts on agricultural markets and 
world trade talks.  The CAP reform agreement is part of a process that began with a Mid-
Term Review (MTR) of the Agenda 2000 reforms (European Commission, 2002) and 
continued through initial legislative proposals that were released in January 2003 
(European Commission, 2003). As of early September 2003, the final legislation has not 
been agreed to, so this analysis is based on the compromise agreement document 
(Council of European Union, 2003). 
 
The compromise agreement did not explicitly address the use of export subsidies, import 
tariffs, or tariff-rate quotas. It did include, however, a significant change in the way that 
the CAP supports farmers directly. The 1992 MacSharry Reforms and the 1999 Berlin 
Agreement on Agenda 2000 shifted the balance of support from price support to direct 
payments to producers. The new compromise agreement goes a stage further, providing 
the possibility of converting most of the direct payments into a more decoupled single 
farm payment. 
 
The final agreement differs from the initial European Commission proposal in a number 
of ways, as adjustments were made to achieve a political compromise.  The compromise 
agreement provides countries with options that complicate the analysis, as methods of 
support are allowed to differ among countries and among regions within countries. As the 
positions of individual countries remain unclear at this time, this analysis examines two 
extreme scenarios in terms of the decoupling of payments.  One scenario assumes that all 
EU countries incorporate as many payments into the decoupled single farm payment as 
the agreement allows; the other scenario assumes that all EU countries choose to do the 
least amount of decoupling permitted by the agreement by maintaining payments tied to 
production wherever it is allowed.  These two scenarios bracket the numerous possible 
outcomes. 
 
A model of the EU-15 agricultural sector was used to conduct this analysis. Ongoing 
work will extend the current EU model to incorporate the 10 countries scheduled to join 
in 2004, but these countries and their effects on current member states are not included in 
this analysis.  In addition to the policy options resulting from the CAP reform agreement 
examined here, the new members are also provided further options regarding how they 
transition from their current policies to the newly reformed CAP. 
 
The model and baseline used are the same that were used earlier this year in the FAPRI-
Ireland analysis of the European Commission’s legislative proposals (Binfield et al, 
2003).1 The baseline is therefore slightly out of date, given weather, exchange rate, and 
other developments. Some of the results are sensitive to the baseline; for example, the 
euro/dollar exchange rate and initial stock levels will influence the impact of the reforms. 
 
                                                 
1 The FAPRI-Ireland study also included the impact of the EU’s proposal on modalities for the Doha round. 
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Policy Assumptions 
 
In addition to a baseline that maintains policies agreed to prior to 2003, two scenarios 
have been simulated. One of them, MOST, assumes that all EU countries choose the 
maximum degree of decoupling that is available to them, i.e., that all adopt the single 
farm payment in 2005. The LEAST scenario assumes that all EU countries do the least 
amount of decoupling that is required, that is, they opt to keep the largest allowed 
proportion of their payments in their present, more coupled form. At present it is not 
possible to determine which of the options countries will choose to implement, and in 
reality the degree of decoupling will likely fall between these extremes. A discussion of 
the implications of different choices is included in the final part of the paper. 
 
The Agreement 
 
There were a number of different changes made to the CAP under the reform agreement. 
They can be characterized as: 
 
i) Fundamental changes to the way that support is provided. The biggest change 
under the reforms is the introduction of the single farm payment. With the 
reforms, it will be possible to pay most of the current direct payments in the 
form of a single farm payment, based on historical claims, that is linked to 
land rather than production. 
ii) Changes that were made to “problem” commodities, such as rice and rye. In 
the case of rice, the previously agreed “Everything but Arms” agreement will 
significantly liberalize access to the EU market by least developed countries, 
raising fears of large increases in EU imports and intervention stocks under 
the current system where the EU market price is roughly double the world rice 
price. In rye, stocks had been building significantly prior to 2003 with 
intervention stock levels exceeding a year’s production. 
iii) The transfer of money between CAP objectives. Over time the single payment 
is “modulated,” i.e., eventually a minimum of 5 per cent of its value is 
transferred to rural development measures. “Degression,” the further reduction 
of payments to finance reforms in other sectors or to meet budgetary 
objectives, will be decided in each year, with the Commission retaining the 
right to modify payment rates by up to 3 per cent. 
 
It was envisaged in the MTR document that virtually all the payments would be 
decoupled and paid as part of the single farm payment. In the course of negotiations 
concessions were made that enabled payments to remain coupled to a certain extent. The 
result is that the reform agreement is complicated, containing concessions to different 
countries and allowing a large number of permutations as to its final implementation. In 
fact, the final legal wording has not been released. 
  
The agreement is summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Major aspects of the CAP reform agreement of 2003 
Single payment A single farm payment replaces various existing payments to 
grain, oilseed, cattle, sheep, and dairy producers.  Countries can 
implement the single farm payment as early as 2005, but no 
later than 2007. 
Entitlement Single farm payment entitlements are awarded to farmers based 
on historical payments. Payment is subject to cross compliance 
criteria, but does not require production of commodities. 
Options Member states can retain a proportion of current payments that 
are tied to production of particular commodities in some cases: 
 
i) Pay 25% of the arable area payment or 40% of the 
durum wheat payment. 
ii) Pay 50% of the ewe premia. 
iii) Pay 100% of the suckler (beef) cow premia and 40% 
of the slaughter premia or 100% of the slaughter 
premia or 75% of the special beef premia. 
 
Member states can also allocate 10% of the total available in the 
form of sector specific payments. 
Modulation For those entitled to claim in excess of 5,000 euro, payment 
rates are reduced by 3% in 2005, 4% in 2006, and 5% from 
2007 onwards. 
Soft wheat, corn, and 
barley 
No change in stated intervention price, but 50% cut in monthly 
increments slightly reduces effective support price. 
Rye Intervention abolished in 2005. 
Durum Supplemental payments in “traditional areas” are reduced from 
344.5 euro/ha in steps to 285 euro/ha by 2006. 
Introduction of special premium of 40 euro/mt. 
Set-aside Largely unchanged. 
Rice Intervention price cut by 50% to 150 euro/mt. Areas eligible for 
payment reduced. Compensation payment paid in two parts (75 
euro/m.t. is crop specific, and 102 euro/mt is part of the single 
payment). 
Energy crops 45 euro/ha payment for energy crops (e.g., rapeseed for oil used 
to produce biodiesel), subject to 1.5 mil. ha limit. 
Cattle  All payments eligible to become part of the single payment. 
Proportion of suckler (beef) cow premia that can be paid on 
heifers is increased to 40%. 
Dairy Relative to planned changes under Agenda 2000: 
- Intervention price cuts moved forward a year, with butter 
support cut by an additional 10% by 2007. 
- Increases in milk quota scheduled for 2005 deferred to 
2006. 
- Further restrictions on purchases into intervention.  
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The Scenarios 
 
The particular choices that the individual countries will make in implementing the reform 
are unknown. Two scenarios are examined in an attempt to bracket possible outcomes. 
 
Scenario MOST 
 
In this scenario, all EU-15 countries are assumed to divert the maximum amount of 
current direct payments into the single farm payment at the earliest time. This means that 
the arable area payment, special beef premia, suckler (beef) cow premia, slaughter 
premia, ewe premia, and the eligible part of the rice premia are included in the new single 
farm payment linked to land, but not to crop production.  
 
In this scenario the dairy payments also become part of the single farm payment, but the 
dairy quota is assumed to continue to be the primary determinant of milk production in 
the European Union. Decoupling of payments is likely to lead to significant restructuring 
of the industry in several countries. 
 
Scenario LEAST 
 
Under this scenario the countries are assumed to transfer the least permissible amount of 
direct payments to the single farm payment at the last possible dates. Decoupling is 
therefore delayed until 2007, and after that point countries are assumed to keep 25 
percent of their arable payment coupled (Italy is assumed to instead keep 40 percent of its 
durum payment coupled). All countries are assumed to retain the option to pay 100 
percent of the suckler cow premia and 40 percent of the slaughter premia in their current 
form. 
 
Note that in the model, the single farm payment is assumed to have some modest impacts 
on supply. Cross compliance criteria that are attached to the payment provide one 
explanation for why the largely decoupled payments may, nevertheless, have supply 
effects.  In addition, in FAPRI models even relatively decoupled payments like the U.S. 
direct payment program are assumed to have some modest effects on production because 
of risk concerns and other factors.  As in the U.S. model, however, a euro (or dollar) 
transferred to producers by means of a relatively decoupled payment like the single farm 
payment has a much smaller effect on production than would the same amount of money 
transferred to producers in a payment more directly tied to current production. 
Results 
 
With a few exceptions, the reforms have only modest impacts on EU agricultural 
commodity supply, consumption, and trade. For soft wheat, barley, corn, oilseeds, pork, 
and poultry, the estimated impacts are very small, primarily because the reformed 
policies represent only a modest departure from current policies.  In contrast, the reforms 
result in a larger deviation from previous policy for the beef, sheep, rice, and rye sectors, 
and the estimated market impacts are correspondingly larger.  
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In interpreting the impact of the introduction of the single payment, it is important to 
consider the extent to which pre-existing programs are coupled to production. For 
example, in the beef and sheep sectors, in order to claim the premia, producers have been 
required to have the animal.  Production effects of the payments are somewhat lessened 
by limits on eligible animals and other program provisions, but the link between payment 
and production is strong in most areas. 
 
In contrast, the pre-existing arable aid payment is much more decoupled. With some 
restrictions, farmers are largely free to select the crop that they grow. There is also the 
opportunity to put the land into voluntary set-aside, which allows farmers to reduce 
production without affecting payments. Shifting from a partially decoupled arable aid 
payment to a more decoupled single farm payment may have only modest effects on 
producers of soft wheat, barley, corn, and oilseeds. 
 
Cereals and oilseeds 
The impact of the reforms on the major cereals and oilseeds is small, as the current 
regime is largely decoupled, and there are provisions in the agreement to prevent the 
conversion of pasture land into crop production. In addition, there were significant 
changes made in the final compromise that meant the estimated impact on this sector is 
smaller than what was projected in analysis of the initial proposals. A summary of the 
estimated effects on the crop sector is included in Table 2. 
 
For most major crops, the agreement results in only small changes in supply, 
consumption, trade, and prices.  While moving to more decoupled payments tends to 
reduce production, the estimated overall effect on area harvested across 9 major crops is a 
modest 1 percent reduction.  Most of the reduction in area is accounted for by durum 
wheat and rye, the two commodities where other policy changes significantly reduce 
marginal production incentives.   
 
The net result is that area and production changes for soft wheat, barley, corn, and 
oilseeds are all less than one percent. The slight reduction in effective support prices 
(because of the reduction in monthly increments to the intervention price) has a slight 
depressing effect on EU market prices, offsetting the impact of reduced production and 
leaving EU market prices very close to baseline levels.  EU grain net exports are slightly 
reduced, but the effect is so small that world prices rise by less than 1 percent. For these 
crops, movements in world prices and exchange rates are likely to have a greater 
influence on the evolution of the sector than the policy reforms. 
 
The reduction in the support payment in the durum sector results in a significant 
reduction in the durum area planted. The abolition of intervention for rye means that the 
rye price falls until stocks are disposed of and area adjusts. In 2003 German cereals 
producers anticipated these changes and had already reduced area somewhat.  Under the 
scenarios, area is well below that which was planted in the years prior to 2002. 
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Table 2. EU-15 crop sector: average results for 2007-2012 
BASELINE MOST (Maximum decoupling) LEAST (Minimum decoupling)
2007-12 2007-12 Change % change 2007-12 Change % change
average average from base from base average from base from base
EU-15 crop area (1000 ha.)
Soft wheat 14,282 14,193 -89 -0.6% 14,226 -56 -0.4%
Durum 3,798 3,613 -186 -4.9% 3,633 -165 -4.4%
Barley 10,750 10,703 -47 -0.4% 10,709 -41 -0.4%
Corn 4,371 4,360 -11 -0.3% 4,360 -11 -0.3%
Rye 960 876 -84 -8.8% 877 -84 -8.7%
Rice 391 385 -6 -1.6% 385 -6 -1.6%
3 major oilseeds* 4,984 4,953 -30 -0.6% 4,975 -8 -0.2%
9-crop total 39,537 39,082 -455 -1.2% 39,165 -372 -0.9%
EU-15 net exports (mmt)
Soft wheat and durum 11.44 10.65 -0.79 -6.9% 10.86 -0.58 -5.1%
Barley, corn, and rye 8.16 7.89 -0.27 -3.3% 7.90 -0.25 -3.1%
EU-15 net imports (mmt)
Rice 1.69 1.14 -0.55 -32.5% 1.13 -0.56 -32.9%
Oilseeds and products 40.64 40.72 0.08 0.2% 40.66 0.01 0.0%
EU-15 prices (euro/mt)
Soft wheat 109.30 109.04 -0.26 -0.2% 108.89 -0.41 -0.4%
Barley 101.74 102.00 0.26 0.3% 101.65 -0.09 -0.1%
Corn 124.19 124.71 0.52 0.4% 124.61 0.42 0.3%
Rice 257.30 173.69 -83.61 -32.5% 173.32 -83.98 -32.6%
World prices ($/mt)
Wheat, U.S. Gulf 146.67 147.66 1.00 0.7% 147.38 0.71 0.5%
Corn, U.S. Gulf 104.73 105.07 0.34 0.3% 104.94 0.21 0.2%
Soybeans, Rotterdam 232.39 233.05 0.65 0.3% 232.56 0.17 0.1%
Rice, Bangkok 258.90 252.46 -6.45 -2.5% 252.44 -6.47 -2.5%
* Soybeans, rapeseed, and sunflowers.
Source: FAPRI estimates for the current 15 members of the European Union.  Does not include impacts on the 10
countries scheduled to join the European Union in 2004.
BASELINE: Continues policies agreed to prior to 2003.  Note that in the case of rice, this includes the "Everything but 
Arms" agreement that would open EU markets to imports of rice from least-developed countries.  Given pre-2003 
policies, high internal prices in the European Union result in a large increase in EU rice imports in the baseline.
MOST: Incorporates the new reforms agreed to this year, and assumes all EU member states will choose the
implementation alternatives that result in the maximum amount of decoupling of payments.
LEAST: Incorporates the new reforms agreed to this year, and assumes all EU member states will choose the
implementation alternatives that result in the minimum amount of decoupling of payments.  
 
 
In the baseline, the high EU domestic rice price relative to world markets results in a 
large increase in imports as the Everything but Arms agreement provides least-developed 
countries access to EU rice markets. The halving of the rice intervention price results in 
lower EU rice prices under both scenarios. Rice-specific payments offset the impact of 
lower prices, resulting in only a modest adjustment in rice area.  With sharply lower 
internal EU rice prices, there is less incentive for least developed countries to ship rice to 
the European Union than is the case under the baseline.   
 
10 
While scenario rice imports are well below baseline levels, they do exceed the levels of 
recent years.  The EU price reductions resulting from the reforms increase EU domestic 
rice consumption.  Further, current formulas mean that the reduction in intervention 
prices also reduces allowed tariffs for rice imports from non-developing countries, and so 
in the early years of the projections, some countries may have an incentive to increase 
sales. The European Union has stated that it wants to negotiate import quotas to address 
this issue.  
 
Livestock and meat 
 
In contrast to the crop sector, more payments in the livestock sector are directly linked to 
production. Support payments are made on cattle and sheep, and the decoupling of these 
payments in the reform scenarios has a significant impact on the sector. The incentive to 
maintain the breeding herd is reduced when the suckler (beef) cow premia and ewe 
premia are decoupled. Insofar as the other payments in the cattle sector are capitalized 
into the price of young animals, decoupling of these payments under the LEAST scenario 
still has a negative impact on production. A summary of the results is included in Table 3. 
 
Note that the estimates reported here represent 2007-2012 averages and may understate 
the potential long-run impacts of decoupling on the beef and sheep sectors.  Because of 
herd dynamics, effects build over time, and the estimated impacts on beef production in 
the MOST scenario are significantly larger in 2012 (a 4 percent reduction) than in 2007 
(less than a 1 percent reduction).   Given the magnitude of the departure from current 
policies, it is difficult to estimate cattle and sheep sector effects with confidence.  The 
impact of the reform will vary between countries depending on their production systems 
and relative reliance on payments. 
 
Given reduced beef and sheep meat production, and with imports of these products 
restricted by TRQs, EU livestock prices rise. The extent of the price rise for beef is 
determined by the Commission’s behavior regarding export refunds. The higher prices in 
the beef sector mean that the Commission has greater scope than under previous policies 
to reduce export subsidy levels, given that it can do so and still leave prices above levels 
that would prevail under current policies. 
 
The changes made in the dairy sector are small, with the quota assumed to continue to 
determine production over the projection period. The reform agreement does include a 
further reduction in the butter support price relative to that previously agreed and the 
incorporation of dairy payments into the single farm payment. It is reasonable to assume 
that this will lead to widespread restructuring of production in many countries, but the 
impact on the aggregate sector figures is likely to be limited. 
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Table 3. EU-15 livestock and dairy sectors: average results for 2007-2012 
BASELINE MOST (Maximum decoupling) LEAST (Minimum decoupling)
2007-12 2007-12 Change % change 2007-12 Change % change
average average from base from base average from base from base
EU-15 meat production (1000 mt)
Beef 7,268 7,079 -189 -2.6% 7,252 -16 -0.2%
Pork 18,483 18,546 63 0.3% 18,494 10 0.1%
Poultry 9,495 9,540 45 0.5% 9,503 8 0.1%
Sheep meat 1,091 1,031 -59 -5.4% 1,072 -18 -1.7%
EU-15 net exports (1000 mt)
Pork 1,275 1,274 0 0.0% 1,275 0 0.0%
Poultry 225 224 -1 -0.5% 225 0 0.0%
EU-15 net imports (1000 mt)
Beef 42 143 101 241.3% 51 9 22.2%
Sheep meat 266 277 12 4.3% 269 3 1.2%
EU-15 prices (euro/mt)
Beef 240.36 254.67 14.30 5.9% 241.89 1.52 0.6%
Pork 132.56 133.42 0.86 0.6% 132.67 0.11 0.1%
Poultry 126.91 127.85 0.94 0.7% 127.03 0.13 0.1%
Sheep meat 367.88 415.42 47.53 12.9% 381.14 13.26 3.6%
EU-15 dairy
Milk production (mmt) 122.36 122.33 -0.02 0.0% 122.34 -0.02 0.0%
4 product net exports* 0.98 0.93 -0.05 -5.0% 0.93 -0.05 -4.9%
Milk price (euro/100 kg) 27.20 26.83 -0.37 -1.4% 26.83 -0.37 -1.4%
* Cheese, butter, skim milk powder, and whole milk powder, mmt.
Source: FAPRI estimates for the current 15 members of the European Union.  Does not include impacts on the 10
countries scheduled to join the European Union in 2004.
BASELINE: Continues policies agreed to prior to 2003.  Note that in the case of dairy, this includes the 2005-2007
scheduled increases in milk quotas and reductions in intervention prices agreed under Agenda 2000.
MOST: Incorporates the new reforms agreed to this year, and assumes all EU member states will choose the
implementation alternatives that result in the maximum amount of decoupling of payments.
LEAST: Incorporates the new reforms agreed to this year, and assumes all EU member states will choose the
implementation alternatives that result in the minimum amount of decoupling of payments.  
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Implications for the WTO Negotiations 
 
The recent CAP reforms appear likely to transfer a sizable portion of EU agricultural 
payments from the exempt, but production limiting, blue box to the exempt green box.  
Currently, the European Union has an amber box limit of 67 billion euro.  For 1999, the 
latest year for which the European Union has reported domestic support, amber box 
support topped 47 billion euro and nearly 20 billion euro was spent on blue box 
payments.  On the basis of previous (pre-2003) CAP reform policies, FAPRI estimates 
annual baseline amber box spending levels of about 34 billion euro (Table 4).  Annual 
baseline blue box spending rises from about 24 billion euro to about 27 billion euro over 
the projection period (the phase-in of dairy payments established under Agenda 2000 
accounts for most of the increase). 
 
The major policy change for WTO purposes is the development of the single farm 
payment scheme.  The payment scheme is structured to fit within the current definition of 
green box income support.  Since most of the payments covered by the single farm 
payment scheme are currently in the blue box, FAPRI analysis indicates a dramatic 
reduction in blue box spending in both scenarios.  In the LEAST scenario, blue box 
spending falls to 7 billion euro annually by 2007.  In the MOST scenario, blue box 
spending is reduced to 0.4 billion euro annually after 2004.  The differences between the 
two scenarios are due to the timing and implementation of payment decoupling.  Under 
both scenarios, annual amber box spending falls slightly, to about 32 billion euro.   
 
This analysis suggests that the European Union could negotiate a sizable reduction in 
amber spending limits, abide by new limits on blue box spending, and still maintain the 
policy structure just approved.  Projected levels of amber box support under both reform 
scenarios are approximately 52 percent below the current WTO limit.  Furthermore, the 
projected level of blue box support, even under the LEAST scenario, is below the limit of 
5 percent of the value of production suggested in the recent EU-U.S. joint proposal (in 
1999, the reported value of agricultural production was more than 233 billion euro; blue 
box support of 7 billion euro would account for just 3 percent of that figure). 
 
While the CAP reforms may have significant effects on measures of EU internal support, 
they do less to reduce EU export subsidies or import barriers.  FAPRI estimates suggest 
only small changes in EU net trade, domestic prices, or world prices for most 
commodities.  For example, net EU trade in wheat and coarse grains is only about 1 
million metric tons lower in the CAP reform scenarios than in the baseline, and both EU 
and world prices change by less than 1 percent.   
 
Exceptions to the general rule of small border measure effects would be in the cases of 
rice (where EU prices fall sharply, and net imports are lower than in the baseline), beef 
(where EU prices rise but exports fall), and butter (where a fall in EU prices reduces the 
tariff level necessary to protect the EU market). 
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Table 4. EU-15 domestic support levels
 
2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
million euro
Permitted AMS 67,170 67,170 67,170
Current AMS
BASELINE 40,081 34,814 34,687 34,744 34,332 33,933 33,505 33,520
MOST 34,687 34,134 32,972 32,388 32,117 32,121
LEAST 34,687 34,134 33,059 32,540 32,174 32,208
Blue box
BASELINE 23,064 24,018 23,989 23,998 25,020 26,029 27,054 27,033
MOST 23,989 25,330 367 372 376 379
LEAST 23,989 25,330 26,976 28,366 7,411 7,089
Sum of current AMS and blue box
BASELINE 63,145 58,831 58,676 58,742 59,352 59,962 60,559 60,553
MOST 58,676 59,463 33,339 32,760 32,493 32,500
LEAST 58,676 59,463 60,034 60,906 39,585 39,297
Current AMS vs. 2003/04 permitted AMS
BASELINE -48% -48% -49% -49% -50% -50%
MOST -48% -49% -51% -52% -52% -52%
LEAST -48% -49% -51% -52% -52% -52%
Sum of current AMS and blue box vs.
2003/04 sum of current AMS and blue box
BASELINE 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 3%
MOST 0% 1% -43% -44% -45% -45%
LEAST 0% 1% 2% 4% -33% -33%
Source: FAPRI estimates of domestic support levels for the current 15 members of the European Union.  Does not include 
impacts on the 10 countries scheduled to join the European Union in 2004.
AMS: Aggregate Measure of Support.
BASELINE: Continues pre-2003 policies.  Includes scheduled adjustments in dairy policy between 2005 and 2007 that were 
agreed as part of the Agenda 2000 reform package in 1999.
MOST: Incorporates the new reforms agreed to this year, and assumes all EU member states will choose the implementation 
alternatives that result in the maximum amount of decoupling of payments.
LEAST: Incorporates the new reforms agreed to this year, and assumes all EU member states will choose the implementation 
alternatives that result in the minimum amount of decoupling of payments.  
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The reforms will allow the EU to spend less on export subsidies. In the beef sector 
production reductions mean that subsidies could be reduced without prices falling below 
baseline. Subsidized beef exports are already well below the URAA limits on volume and 
value. In the dairy sector, the EU is closer to the URAA limits, but the reduction in 
support prices and fall in exports would reduce subsidized exports. 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
Quantifying the impacts of the 2003 CAP reforms is difficult at this time.  Implementing 
legislation has yet to be approved, and the compromise agreement gives countries 
considerable latitude in how they choose to implement key provisions.   
 
Perhaps just as important, it is very difficult to predict with confidence how EU 
producers will respond to the proposed decoupling of many payment programs.  Based on 
the response of U.S. producers to the significant decoupling of many U.S. support 
programs in 1996, it appears likely that there will be cases where the analysis under- or 
over-estimates impacts, or even misses the direction of impacts. 
  
With those caveats in mind, it nevertheless appears likely that the reforms will have only 
modest impacts on producers of soft wheat, barley, corn, oilseeds, hogs, and poultry.  For 
the major grains and oilseeds, previous policy reforms had already partially decoupled 
certain payments, so the further decoupling mandated by the reforms has only small 
estimated effects.  In contrast, the reforms will significantly affect marginal incentives for 
producers of cattle, sheep, rye, durum wheat, and rice, so the estimated impacts on those 
sectors are generally larger. 
 
Perhaps more important than the supply-and-demand impacts, the reforms may have an 
important effect on EU negotiating positions at the WTO talks.  Assuming the single 
farm payment is classified in the green box, the reforms would sharply reduce EU blue 
box spending.  An agreement that places limits on blue box spending and requires 
significant reductions in amber box support from current permitted levels may not require 
major changes in EU agricultural policies beyond those included in the reform package. 
However, it should be noted that for sugar and other sectors not directly affected by the 
current reforms, both trade and domestic concerns are expected to lead to further EU 
reform efforts.   
 
The reforms have only small impacts on EU export subsidies and market access for most 
commodities.  The terms of a new WTO agreement in the areas of export subsidies and 
market access could prove very important to EU and world agriculture.  
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